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This paper presents an investigation of command and control during Multi-Agency Operations; the
purpose of this study was to elaborate on known themes associated with multi-agency emergency
response, through a study of the successful combined military and civilian defence of Walham electricity
substation from rising ﬂood water in July 2007.
This case study demonstrates that effective coordination during major emergencies requires the
development of a deeper, shared understanding of the incident and a high level of trust between
responding organisations, both of which are effortful to achieve and difﬁcult to support with current
communications systems. Adoption of a sociotechnical systems approach during the development
process may enable future communications systems to support these important social processes.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
The signiﬁcant body of workwithin the ﬁeld of disaster research
has identiﬁed a number of problem areas associated with the
coordination of large-scale emergencies, though much of the
previous work on ﬂoods and other disasters concentrates more on
the high-level (strategic) response. The current study is concerned
with the coordination of a relatively small and well deﬁned inci-
dent, which was part of a wider emergency; it might therefore be
expected that the response would proceed in an entirely straight-
forward manner. Consequently, the difﬁculties encountered by the
responding agencies during the successful resolution of this
‘simple’ incident have implications for the future management of
larger and more complex disasters.
1.2. Features of major emergencies
Major emergencies typically feature high levels of complexity
and ambiguity. Recognizing that large-scale emergencies occur
with little or no notice, involve temporary organisations of agencies
who rarely (if ever) work together and improvised organisationalCOP, Common Operational
-Governmental Organisation;
ional Lifeboat Institute; SOP,
; fax: þ44 (0) 121 414 4291.
ster).
and The Ergonomics Society. All ristructures (Smith and Dowell, 2000), effective management of
major emergencies would appear to be an impossible task (Boin
and T’Hart, 2003). Major emergencies have been deﬁned in terms
of their “un-ness”, i.e. unexpected, unprecedented and unman-
ageable (Hewitt, 1983). Thus, multi-agency emergency operations
share a number of potentially problematical features, including:
 Ad hoc teams that work together only when responding to an
emergency incident;
 Multiple objectives which have to be achieved in parallel for
the incident to be successfully contained;
 High psychological demands, with people working under time
pressure and stressful conditions;
 Role specialisation, with the need to pool different types of
expertise.
(Crichton et al., 2000, p. 208)
During the initial stages of an incident, it is unlikely that any single
organisationwill be inpossessionof all available informationevarious
organisations will hold ‘pieces of the puzzle’ (McMaster et al., 2007).
First responders to the incident will seek to gather as much local
information as they can, in order to both assess the situation and
determine an appropriate response. However, these activities of
assessment and response generation will be deﬁned by the training,
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and experience of the ﬁrst
responder. When personnel from other agencies arrive and seek
brieﬁngs from the ﬁrst responder, there is a challenge in developing
a shared understanding of the incident. Close cooperation between
responding agencies is therefore required, in order to enable
a coherent response to the emergency. However, cooperation does notghts reserved.
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between agencies and disagreement over who is in charge (Boin and
T’Hart, 2007). Improvisation, in terms of developing novel, situation-
speciﬁc organisational structures, coordination mechanisms and
individual roles, has also been identiﬁed as a recurring response to the
unique demands of crisis situations (Mendonça et al., 2007; Auf der
Heide, 1989). This requires the application of knowledge outside of
traditional emergency response domains and the coordination of
interdependent tasks, with high levels of uncertainty (Dynes,1970; de
Marchi, 1995; Boin, 2004; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2008; von Lubitz
et al., 2008).
1.3. Multi-agency incident response to ﬂoods: previous research
Environmental disasters are having an increasing impact glob-
ally, in terms of the rising numbers of incidents, people affected and
the economic cost (Boulle et al., 1997). The multi-agency responses
to two recent crises e the South Asian Tsunami and Hurricane
Katrina have both received criticism. Both of these disasters
required improvisation on the part of the responding agencies,
including the adaptation of procedures and the development of ad
hoc coordination structures, though this was achieved with limited
success in each case (Bennett et al., 2006; Chua et al., 2007).
Additionally, military resources and logistical capabilities were
invaluable in the immediate aftermath of the South Asian tsunami
and Hurricane Katrina, though in both instances there was a failure
to fully integrate the military into the response, which reduced
their effectiveness (Bennett et al., 2006; Chua et al., 2007; Telford,
2007). Case studies of earlier ﬂoods reveal similar evaluations; for
example, Rahman (1996) found that there was a lack of coordina-
tion of the response to the 1988 ﬂoods in Bangladesh, including
a lack of trust of NGOs by local administrators, resulting in their
exclusion from planning programs (Rahman, 1996). In summary,
there are eleven broad issues that these studies raise:
(1) Lack of coordination between Agencies;
(2) Failure to communicate warnings and other information;
(3) Competitive practices;
(4) Lack of trust between Agencies;
(5) Slow mobilization of response;
(6) Response systemsoverwhelmedby the scale of the emergency;
(7) Failure to share information between Agencies;
(8) Poorly deﬁned chains of command;
(9) Interoperability failures;
(10) Lack of awareness of the presence and activity of other
Agencies in the area;
(11) Failure to fully integrate military into the response.
The fact that these issues recur so often imply that there are
inherent challenges associated with the coordination of multi-
agency emergency responses; given that the failure of agencies to
coordinate their activities during emergency responses is hampering
their effectiveness, what is it that is preventing them from
cooperating?
1.4. Government response to major emergencies
Following any major emergency, there will be reviews and
enquiries culminating in lessons learned and, in some instances,
recommendations for new legislation and requirements on the
Services involved in Emergency Response. For example, an inquiry
into the ﬁre at King’s Cross London Underground station in November
1987 (Fennell, 1988) identiﬁed a lack of coordination amongst
agencies involved and recommended the use of inter-agency training
exercises (which are now held on an annual basis in the UK) andimprovements in joint planning and communication. The UK
Government recently implemented the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act
which deﬁnes multi-agency Integrated Emergency Management in
terms of six activities: Anticipate, Assess, Prevent, Prepare, Respond
and Recover (HMGovernment, 2005a). These activities are supported
by eight guiding principles for emergency response, which can be
related to the conclusions drawn from investigations into previous
emergency responses:
 Direction: clarity of purpose deﬁned by a strategic aim and
objectives;
 Integration: effective and efﬁcient coordination between
agencies involved in the response;
 Subsidiarity: coordination occurs at the lowest appropriate
level;
 Preparedness: all agencies, and their members, have clear
understanding of their role and appropriate knowledge and
abilities to undertake these roles;
 Continuity: organisations should be able to employ Standard
Operating Procedures such that their response to the emer-
gency involves well-drilled activities, albeit at a greater tempo;
 Communication: reliable information is passed as efﬁciently as
possible to all agencies who need it, including the public;
 Cooperation: agencies cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust and
understanding;
 Anticipation: risk assessment and identiﬁcation is performed
in an ongoing manner in order to ascertain any possible
changes in level of risk so that the response can be managed as
appropriately and ﬂexibly as possible.
(HM Government, 2005b, p. 6)1.5. Overarching themes
The 8 principles of the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act can be
combined with the 11 issues raised earlier to produce four over-
arching themes of multi-agency emergency responses which might
be used to guide further research:
 Organisational structures and practices;
 Communications, information sharing and shared awareness of
the incident;
 Cooperation and coordination of response activities;
 Command, strategy (command intent) and decision making.
Table 1 indicates how these broad themes have been derived.
2. Investigation
2.1. Case study: Gloucestershire ﬂoods July 2007
The summer of 2007 sawwidespread ﬂooding in several regions
of the UK; the ﬂoods of June and July were the most costly in UK
history and some of the most expensive disasters worldwide in
2007, with losses of over £2 billion for each month (Munich Re,
2008). One of the worst affected areas was Gloucestershire in the
South West of England, with widespread ﬂooding across the
county. In addition to the extensive damage caused to businesses
and residential properties, travel became difﬁcult as roads and
towns ﬂooded, trapping hundreds of people in their homes. The
electricity supply to large parts of the county was put at risk when
both the Walham and Castlemeads substations came under threat
from rising ﬂood water (Elliott and Brown, 2007). Walham
substation is a site of critical national importance, supplying elec-
tricity to over 500,000 homes (an estimated 2,000,000 people) in
Table 1
Derivation of the four themes of multi-agency emergency responses from issues highlighted in earlier research and recent legislation.
Theme Organisational structures
and practices
Communications, information
sharing and shared awareness
of the incident
Cooperation and coordination of
response activities
Command,strategy
(command intent) and
decision making
2004 Civil Contingencies
Act principles
 Continuity  Communication  Subsidiarity
 Cooperation
 Integration
 Direction
 Anticipation
 Preparedness
Issues identiﬁed from
previous emergency
response studies
 Response systems
overwhelmed by the
scale of the emergency
 Poorly deﬁned chains
of command
 Slow mobilization
of response
 Failure to communicate
warnings and other information
 Failure to share information
between Agencies
 Lack of awareness of the
presence and activity of other
Agencies in the area
 Lack of coordination
between Agencies
 Competitive practices
 Lack of trust between
Agencies
 Interoperability failures
 Failure to integrate civil
and military responses
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ﬂooded, then this may have forced the mass evacuation of the
county, due to the resulting failures of essential infrastructure
(Grifﬁn, 2007).
On Sunday 22nd July, a multi-agency operation was launched to
prevent rising ﬂood water from overwhelmingWalham substation at
high tide during the night (the section of the River Severn near to
Walham is tidal). The response involved hundreds of personnel from
a number of organisations, including multiple Fire and Rescue
Services, the Environment Agency and initially personnel from several
Royal Air Force (RAF) bases. The plan of actionwas to construct a series
of ﬂood defences around the critical substation switching room; this
included the use of sandbag reinforcements, a one kilometre ring of
the Environment Agency’s modular ﬂood barrier and deployment of
specialist Fire and Rescue high volume pumps to drain the site.
Despite the short notice and difﬁcult working conditions, the
various agencies were able to coordinate an effective response and
prevented the ﬂood water from forcing the shutdown of the
substation, buying time for semi-permanent ﬂood defences to be
constructed around the site. In comparison, the nearby Castlemead
substation had to be shutdown, cutting power to around 50,000
homes, before ﬂood defences could be established and power
restored (Environment Agency, 2007).
2.2. Aims of the research
This study aims to follow on from previous research, by using
the themes identiﬁed from the literature (as summarised in Section
1.5) to provide a structure for this speciﬁc case study, in order to
elaborate on these themes and to identify any further issues. In
order to do this, four aspects of multi-agency command and control
were examined:
 The various organisational structures and work practices
employed during the response;
 Communication and the development and maintenance of
shared awareness within and across agencies;
 Inter-agency cooperation and coordination;
 Decision making and the formulation and communication of
command intent.
What makes this study a little different from previous work is
that we focus on a relatively small, well-focussed incident. Further,
rather than attempting to learn lessons from failures, our focus was
on an incident that had been successfully resolved. One would
assume that the shared focus (i.e., protect the electrical substation)
would lead to a fairly straightforward approach to the incident.
However, this does not factor in the effects of the weather or of the
need to combine activity across several different agencies.2.3. Method
Whilst it is extremely difﬁcult to conduct data collection ‘live’
duringmajor emergencies, it is important to acknowledge that there
are several limitations to the approach taken in this paper; ﬁrstly,
the low number of interviewees increases the risk that the research
ﬁndings do not accurately reﬂect this incident, or relatemorewidely
to other emergency responses. Secondly, the interval between the
incident and the subsequent interviews risks the participants
forgetting important details and the introduction of bias into their
interpretations of events. Despite these drawbacks, it is felt that the
case study presented here provides a useful description of the
problems associated with multi-agency response work. Addition-
ally, the method adopted for this study closely resembles that of
Smith and Dowell’s (2000) investigation of a railway accident.
This retrospective case studywas concernedwith the coordination
of the response at the scene of the incident, which is known as the
Bronze level of command. Whilst a large number of organisations
were actively involved in the response to the ﬂooding of Walham
substation, we have further concentrated our analysis on the main
agencies involved in the construction of ﬂood defences and the
extraction of water from the site. Themilitary and emergency services
worked at the site for several days, protecting the substation until the
immediate risk from the ﬂood water lessened and more permanent
defences could be put in place. We focussed our attention on the
crucial initial period of activity, during which the agencies involved
were notiﬁed of the problem, resources and equipment were mobi-
lised, the emergency defences were constructed and the substation
was successfully protected during the ﬁrst high tide that threatened to
inundate it. This activity all took place over an approximately 12 hour
period, during the night of Sunday 22nd July 2007.
Interviews were conducted with six individuals that were directly
involved in theplanning andexecutionof the incident response for the
three main agencies involved (Fire and Rescue, Environment Agency
and Military); their roles and organisational afﬁliations are listed in
Table2. Thesesemi-structured interviewsbeganbyaskingparticipants
to provide an account of the events that occurred that day. The
participants were then asked for more detailed descriptions of and
reﬂectionsonparticular featuresof theemergency responserelating to
the issues identiﬁed in the literature review, including: organisational
structures, inter-agency communication and cooperation, command
intent, signiﬁcant decision points and difﬁculties encountered during
the response. The high-level question set used during the initial
interviews is shown in Appendix 1. The semi-structured nature of the
interviews allowed for the identiﬁcation and discussion of issues not
speciﬁcally identiﬁed in advance which arose during the interviews,
for example the use of liaison roles and adaptation to changing
circumstances. These issues are discussedwithin the framework of the
four main aspects of command and control. The revised Critical
Table 2
Roles of the six interviewees and the Agencies that they represented.
Agency Interviewee/Role
Avon Fire and Rescue Service - Incident Commander e ‘Bronze’
(during the Consolidation Phase)
Gloucestershire Fire and
Rescue Service
- Deputy Chief Fire Ofﬁcer e
‘Gold Liaison’
43 (Wessex) Brigade - Joint Regional Liaison
Ofﬁcer
- Walham Site Liaison Ofﬁcer
(Brigade Reinforcement Team)
Environment Agency - Team Leader (Operations Delivery)
- Specialist Team Member
(Operations Delivery)
Vignette 1: Requests for diesel
Due to the protracted nature of the county-wide emergency
and the high numbers of resources involved, the refuelling
of Fire and Rescue appliances became a priority concern. In
response, the Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue command
structure was modified, by creating the role of ‘Pseudo
Silver’ e a tactical command function entirely dedicated to
the specific problem of coordinating the refuelling
operation.
The Incident Commander on the scene at Walham reported
that when hemade requests for fuel to be sent to the site (in
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then used to explore the decision making processes which were
applied during the incident.
The interviews were analysed in parallel, to identify points of
commonality and divergence; participants were then contacted
again (by telephone or email) in order to clarify points and to check
for accuracy. Publicly available documentation on the incident was
also used to verify the accounts provided. The interview process
took place over a 3 month period, which began 3 months after the
incident took place.order to protect ‘critical national infrastructure’), he was told
that other incidents took priority and was not given an
estimated time of arrival for the fuel. As a lack of diesel for
the pump generators had the potential to lead to the
substation flooding (with the potential consequence of a full-
scale evacuation of the county), the Incident Commander
was forced to request that the Deputy Chief Fire Officer
(acting as ‘Gold Liaison’) contact Pseudo Silver and use his
authority within Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service in
order to ensure that fuel would be delivered in time.3. Results
3.1. Overview
Table 3 presents a summary of the responses by personnel from
each agency across the four themes under investigation. These
themes are discussed in the following sections of the paper and
four vignettes e short passages of text describing the incident,Table 3
Summary of responses by personnel from the three agencies for each theme.
Themes Agency
Fire and Rescue Environm
Organisational
structures
Adaptations at strategic, tactical and operational
command levels, due to the scale of the wider
emergency.
‘Rule breaking’ on-site command structures
necessary due to local conditions.
Simple o
teams, w
Comman
Shared
awareness
Risk assessment based on pooled information
from different agencies.
Not able to book people off and on from the inner
cordon, so dealt with site safety instead of
individual safety.
National
paramet
“Experien
risk was
empower
througho
Cooperation “Very good work ethic from everyone on site.
everyone was focussed.”
“Environment Agency had the critical equipment,
therefore their requirements had precedence.
They wanted to bring in dam components on big
articulated lorries.all work had to stop to allow
this, as it was time-critical.”
“The military were deployed in support of the
Environment Agency.”
“Military
them.w
with it.”
“Fire brig
hard to g
speak to
had been
it was to
the gap.”
Command
intent
“There was a common goal e to prevent the
substation ﬂooding. Incident objective didn’t
progress ewas very simple.”
The Commander was concerned with a number of
priorities, including site drainage, completion of
the EA barrier and the level of risk to personnel.
“We need
high tide
EA were
the barriproduced from the combined accounts of the interviewees e are
provided to illustrate the arguments being made.
3.2. Organisational structures and practices
During the operation to save Walham substation, a number
of alterations were made to standard command structures in order
to cope with unique features of the situation; for example, the Fire
and Rescue Service command structure for the incident was
substantially more complex than the basic Gold, Silver, Bronze
structure intended for use during Major Incidents in the UK (Fig. 1).
Whilst some of these changes were pre arranged, many were madeent Agency (EA) Military
n-site command structure: two
ith one team leader liaising with Fire
der and military Liaison Ofﬁcer.
Coordinated centrally by Brigade
personnel in Gold Command at
Police HQ.
Ad hoc organisational structure
established on-site.
Grid personnel gave EA the
ers within which they could work.
ce would tell our guys when the
becoming too great. All the men are
ed to do dynamic risk assessments
ut the operation.”
Liaison Ofﬁcer remained with Fire
Commander, to gain an
understanding of the situation:
“.stick to Bronze Commander like
a leech.”
Regular status reports sent back to
Gold Command.
were really good e couldn’t fault
e told them what to do, they got on
ade took control of site but were
et hold of. hard at times to get to
e very busy.by the time the request
put through the chain of command,
o late to get [the lorry] through
Liaison Ofﬁcer briefed and acted as a
broker between the Fire
Commander and the RAF teams.
RAF teams were assigned to work
under the direction of the
Environment Agency.
ed to get the barrier put up by
.”
familiar with the task, having used
er 6 times in the last 12 months.
Briefed to provide the maximum
support to the Bronze Commander e
within their abilities and whilst
taking into consideration the safety
of personnel
Fig. 1. Fire and Rescue Major Incident command structure adopted during the
response to the ﬂooding of Walham electricity substation, from the perspective of the
Incident Commander (further probable lines of communication not observed by the
Incident Commander are indicated by dashed lines).
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howconstraints of the emergency situation may force commanders
to adapt their organisations to better suit the environment inwhich
they have to work.Table 4
Responses to CDM questions from the various organisations in relation to the risk assess
CDM question Fire and rescue
Goal speciﬁcation
What was your overall goal?
Prevent the substation from
ﬂooding.
Cue identiﬁcation
What features were you
looking at when you
formulated your decision?
Hazard conditions (advice from
RNLI, National Grid, reports
from ﬁre ﬁghters).
Predicted time and height of
ﬂood water at high tide.
Lack of PPE for the military.
Control measures.
Improvised evacuation signals.
Conceptual model
Are there any situations in
which your decision would
have turned out differently?
Describe the nature of these
situations.
Evacuated all non-essential
personnel near high tide, as risk
of water overwhelming the
defences rose.
Inﬂuence of uncertainty
At any stage, were you
uncertain about the
appropriateness
of the decision?
Constant review of decision;
risk to personnel set against
priority of goal; measures
taken to manage risks.
Situation awareness
What information did you
have available to you at the
time of the decision?
Hazard assessment from
National Grid: maximum
safe ﬂood water level.
Water depth and hazard
assessment from RNLI and
Fire and Rescue personnel.
Compliance with PPE.
Time of high tide.Due to the scale of the emergency, Gloucestershire Fire and
Rescue drew support from neighbouring Fire services under the
established ‘Mutual Aid’ scheme; atWalham,many of the personnel
on-site e including the Incident Commander e were from the
neighbouring Avon Fire and Rescue Service, meaning that the Inci-
dent Commanderwas not directly part of the GloucestershireMajor
Incident command structure. In response to this, the Deputy Chief
Fire Ofﬁcer (DCFO) from Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service
was deployed on-site, to act as ‘Gold Liaison’ e a non-standard role
created for this situation. The DCFO was ‘hands off’, i.e. he was not
directly involved in the command of the incident response, but did
provide direct input to Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Gold
Command on the progress of the response to the emergency situ-
ation, acting as “eyes and ears” for Gloucestershire Gold Command,
who had overall command of the strategic response to the ﬂooding
emergency. The DCFO also provided advice and support to the
Incident Commander when he experienced problems due to
working in an unfamiliar county; Vignette 1 provides an example of
this. The overall Fire and Rescue Command structure in relation to
the response to the Walham substation ﬂooding is shown in Fig. 1,
with lines of communication shown by the arrows.
Whilst it is clear is that the Fire and Rescue Services needed to
modify their standard organisational structures to take account of
the use of multi-county resources and the wider ﬂooding emer-
gency, this resulted in the bypassing of Silver (tactical) Command,
which appears to have led to a loss of situation awareness at this
level of Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue’s major incident
command structure. The critical role of Walham substation was
recognised at both Gold and Bronze Command levels, though this
seems not to have been the case at the Silver level, at least in terms
of the prioritisation of refuelling requirements by Pseudo Silver,
as can be seen from Vignette 1. It would appear that Pseudo Silverment of having staff working inside the electricity substation.
Environment Agency Military
Construction of the ﬂood
barrier before high tide.
Told to report to the incident site
and provide maximum support
to the Incident Commander.
Dynamic risk assessment e
deemed safe to work on-site,
safe to walk on and off site.
National Grid guidelines on
safe working practices.
Evacuation signal from Fire
and Rescue.
The risk assessment of the Fire
and Rescue Service.
State of ﬂood water across
approach road e determined
this necessitated vehicular
transport on and off site.
Fire Brigade were worried they
would not be able to control
the water level; they evacuated
everyone before high tide.
Continuous review of decision
by all parties, under the
chairmanship of Incident
Commander.
Staff familiar with the task and
experienced in working in water
hazard, had constructed the barrier
several times that year.
Trusted the National Grid as
they are experts.
Could see Incident Commander
was hesitant about military
commitment to an unpleasant
task
Safe working practices from
National Grid, experience
of EA personnel.
The risk assessment of the Fire
and Rescue Service.
Vignette 2: Perceptions of the incident
The Environment Agency team had a specialist role in the
response, namely the deployment of their flood barrier
equipment e a task which they were familiar with, having
already used the barrier several times that year. From their
perspective, the incident was straightforward and they
knew what had to be done, but they felt that the Fire and
Rescue Service were slow to adapt to the pace and nature of
the incident; during the early stages, the Environment
Agency considered the Fire and Rescue Service to be ‘in the
way’, as they were having difficulty in getting the vehicles
bringing their barrier components onto the site. The fire
service brought in a number of appliances to deal with the
incident. In the opinion of the Environment Agency, this
seemed to be far more equipment than was required, as
they felt that they were already dealing with the incident
appropriately. The Environment Agency personnel spoken
to asserted that it was their equipment, personnel and
knowledge that had been crucial in the defence of Walham
and that this was not sufficiently recognised either by the
Fire and Rescue Service or in media reports of the incident.
The Fire and Rescue Bronze Commander was the overall
Incident Commander and therefore had responsibility for
the coordination of the whole multi-agency response, as
well as the safety of all personnel working on the site.
Therefore, from the Fire and Rescue Commander’s
perspective the incident was much more complex, with
many factors to consider, including numerous hazards and
a number of equally critical aspects to the flood defences, of
which the Environment Agency barrier was one part. Due to
the rising groundwater, 8 specialist high volume pumps
were brought in from Fire and Rescue Services around the
country to keep the flood water level within the substation
down; this was one of the reasons for the large number of
Fire appliances at the scene. The Incident Commander felt
that all of the agencies involved in the response were
focussed on the same goal, rather than thinking that their
own agenda was more important.
R. McMaster, C. Baber / Applied Ergonomics 43 (2012) 38e47 43Command considered Walham to be ‘one of many incidents’,
rather than ‘the top priority incident’.
3.3. Communications, information sharing and shared awareness
of the incident
Table 4 summarises the responses to CDM probes from the three
organisations interviewed in relation to the decision to keep
personnel working on the site.
During this incident, one of the key decisions was the ongoing
assessment of whether it was safe for personnel to work on-site. In
order to do this, information on a number of factors was collected
and combined to produce an overall risk assessment for the site, as
is summarised in Table 4. The National Grid established safe
working practices for personnel operating in live electrical areas
and deﬁned a maximum depth for ﬂood water to reach before it
would become too dangerous to remain on-site. Royal National
Lifeboat Institute (RNLI) crews monitored water depths around the
site and assessed ﬂood water risk to personnel, as well as reporting
on compliance with the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
by personnel on-site. The Fire and Rescue Service took information
from all sources, and the Incident Commander assessed the overall
risk to personnel working on the site. On the face of it, all agencies
shared the same overall goal (i.e. to prevent the substation from
ﬂooding) and were clear on what needed to be done. However,
Table 4 suggests that the responding organisations were actually
working to slightly different priorities and making decisions based
on different environmental cues, as well as on their own experience
and expertise; whilst these priorities were broadly the same, their
perspectives as to how these objectives were to be achieved
differed to the extent that they conﬂicted.
The different personnel involved inmulti-agency operations can
also produce different interpretations of the incident, both across
organisations and between levels of command. AtWalham, thiswas
most notable in the contrasting perceptions described in Vignette 2.
The Environment Agency and Fire and Rescue Service were con-
cerned with similar elements of the incident, but formed very
different perceptions of the problem and the appropriate multi-
agency response. The Environment Agency felt that theywere being
obstructed by the Fire and Rescue Service, who were trying to
balance the competing requirements of different aspects of the
response. In addition, both the Fire and Rescue Service and Envi-
ronment Agency are Category 1 responders (under the Civil
Contingencies Act, 2004) and are used to being ‘in charge’ of their
own operations. Whilst the Environment Agency recognised that
the Fire and Rescue Service were in control of the site and that they
were concernedwith the safety of personnelworking there, some of
their comments indicate that they were not comfortable with the
command situation and suggest that they may not have recognised
the primacy of the Fire and Rescue Service. For example, they
described how the Fire Service “took control of the site”, that the
Environment Agency were “outnumbered 50:1” and that in their
opinion the Fire Service told themwhere to go to be “out of theway.”
3.4. Cooperation and coordination of response activities
The ﬂooding incident at Walham substation featured multiple
agencies working on the same tasks simultaneously (such as the
construction of ﬂood defences and the drainage of ﬂood water from
the site) and towards a commongoal (i.e. to save the substation from
ﬂooding). This commonality of goals and tasks meant that close
cooperation across the responding organisations was necessary in
order to effectively deal with the incident and to prevent them from
working at cross purposes to each other. The different agencies
operated their own communications equipment: the EnvironmentAgency and Fire and Rescue Services each had their own incom-
patible radio systems, whilst the military did not have any
communications equipment of their own andwere forced to rely on
the Fire and Rescue Service to pass messages across the site for
them. As a result, inter-agency cooperation at the Bronze command
level required physical proximity; this was not easy to achieve,
given that the various agencies were engaged in different tasks
around the site and movement was restricted by ﬂood water,
electrical hazards, construction activity and a constant ﬂow of
heavy machinery in and out of the site.
Coordination of site access between the responding agencies
also appears to have been problematical, with apparent failures to
request information from and present information to other
agencies, as is described in Vignette 3. This failure to ‘push’ and
‘pull’ information likely stems in part from a lack of awareness
between the responding organisations (namely the Environment
Agency and Fire and Rescue Service) regarding each other’s roles,
methods and processes. This is likely to be exacerbated during
a Major Incident, where the organisations are faced with a unique
problem and it may not be immediately apparent what factors
should be concentrated on. In addition, as can be seen from
Vignette 2, unfamiliarity between agencies led the Environment
Agency to interpret the Fire and Rescue Service’s actions as having
selﬁsh or malign intentions, which is unlikely to have motivated
them to cooperate. Thus, there are also mental barriers to cooper-
ation between responding agencies.
Vignette 3: Coordination of activity
National Grid safety personnel advised the responding
agencies at Walham on safe working practices; these
restricted the use of lifting equipment in parts of the site,
meaning that sections of the Environment Agency flood
barrier would have to be moved into place by hand. It
became clear to the Environment Agency team that they did
not have enough personnel to complete the construction of
their barrier in the time available. The military teams sent to
the site were tasked with moving barrier components into
place and assisting the Environment Agency with
construction work.
The Incident Commander kept Liaison Officers from the
military and RNLI close by, as he needed to maintain
constant contact with these organisations. The Fire
Commander initially thought that the Environment Agency
were happy to be left to get on with their tasks, leaving him
to focus on other aspects of the response. However, the
large articulated vehicles bringing Environment Agency
equipment had been held up in the queue of traffic outside
the incident cordon. Once the Environment Agency Team
Leader realised what had happened, he tried to get the
lorries into the queue of traffic entering the site, but their
size meant that all other vehicles would have to be stopped
to let them in and out. This delay put the completion of the
barrier before high tide at risk. The Environment Agency
Team Leader approached the Fire Commander and they
discussed the problem, agreeing that, given the need to
complete the barrier on time, these lorries had to be given
priority access. All other work and site traffic was stopped to
allow the lorries into the site to be unloaded.
Vignette 4: On-site improvisation
The Fire and Rescue Service would normally track indi-
vidual people entering and leaving the inner cordon (hazard
zone) of an incident; however, the large numbers of people
continually moving on and off site meant that this was not
possible, so safety was managed at the site rather than the
individual level, with the RNLI boat crews being used to
monitor the welfare of personnel on-site and compliance
with PPE (where available).
Due to the lack of compatible communications between the
different services, it was not possible to rely on radios to
transmit the evacuation signal in the event that the risk from
the flood water became too great. Instead, an emergency
services vehicle parked in a prominent position on a raised
area of ground was nominated and all personnel were told
that if the emergency lights and sirens on this vehicle were
activated, then this was the signal to evacuate the site.
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use of Liaison Ofﬁcers. The role of Liaison Ofﬁcer appears to func-
tion as an interface between different organisations, bridging their
different languages, practices and perspectives on an incident and
helping to build trust between organisations. Indeed, the Military
Liaison Ofﬁcer working on-site commented that his role was to
understand and communicate the needs of each agency on-site.
The value of this role was demonstrated by their widespread and
effective use by the military and the number of ad hoc liaison roles
that were created within other organisations, in order to address
the particular needs of this incident and to ensure continuity of
purpose across organisations and levels of command.
3.5. Command, strategy (command intent) and decision making
The large numbers of responding agencies, combined with
communications problems and a lack of on-site command support
meant that events began to overwhelm the ‘control’ aspect of the
command and control capability. The Fire and Rescue Service
therefore adapted their working practices to the situation:
command roles, reporting lines and procedures were altered to
take account of the situation they were faced with. In addition to
the organisational changes already discussed, a number of adap-
tations were required to minimise risks to the individuals involved
in the response, as described in Vignette 4. These examples
demonstrate how the constraints of an emergency situation
may force decision-makers to adapt virtually everything else and
the consequent requirement for command structures to be able
to adapt to extraordinary situations.
Given the hazards posed by the live electricity substation and the
presence of ﬂood water, one of the key decisions during the incident
was the risk assessment for personnelworkingon the site. As theﬂoodwater level rose, the concern became thatwatermight suddenly break
through the temporary defences and inundate the site. The decision to
have staff remain on-site was therefore regularly reassessed and all
non-essential staff were evacuated prior to high tide.
4. Discussion
It is clear that duringmajor incidents, all agencies concentrate their
efforts on resolving the emergency, but despite this there are some
problems that are inherent within the nature of the situation and of
multi-agency operations; our ﬁndings can be summarised as follows:
4.1. The context of the situation forced responding agencies away
from formal structures and procedures
As a result of the severe limitations imposed by the restricted
location, numerous hazards, short timeframe and environmental
conditions, the responding agencies were forced to adapt almost
every aspect of their response, from ad hoc alterations of organ-
isational structures, to adaptation of procedures, roles and the use of
equipment. In order to meet the demands of an exceptional inci-
dent, conventional rules that are enshrined in Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) had to be circumvented or ‘broken’. Whilst this is
not a new ﬁnding (see Auf der Heide, 1989; Smith and Dowell,
2000), this study has shown that such adaptations can result in
problems, such as misunderstandings with other agencies which
can jeopardize the incident response. Mendonça et al. (2007) also
note that both organisational and individual level improvisation
demand high levels of communication. It is therefore necessary to
ensure close coordination and negotiation between organisations in
order to achieve andmaintain a position of shared understanding of
the situation and the appropriate response e something which was
not aided during the Walham emergency by the incompatibility of
communications technologies in use by the responding agencies.
Whilst modiﬁcations to organisational structures were felt
necessary as a result of the nature of the emergency, there were
unintended consequences of this reorganisation, as could be seen
with the Fire and Rescue Service, where a loss of situation aware-
ness at the Silver level of command may have been related to the
‘short-circuit’ made between the incident site and Gold Command.
Given the safety-critical nature of the emergency response envi-
ronment, making ad hoc alterations is therefore inherently risky
and e where possible e steps should be taken to minimise the
unintended consequences of any changes. This may be achieved
through the adoption of command and control networks and
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limiting their complexity, introducing redundancy and making
information links and lines of communication more explicit. Soft-
ware may also be able to assist with this process, by providing
a simple form of error checking, for example, by indicating where
a node or agent has become disconnected from the source of the
information it requires.
4.2. Problems with the management of command intent across ad
hoc and fragmented systems
The high levels of uncertainty andmulti-domain nature of major
emergencies requires effective communication and sharing of
information between agencies; though awareness of even a ‘simple’
incident can vary widely and achieving shared understanding
across different organisations is labour intensive. This helps explain
why common goals at the strategic level can still lead to different
(conﬂicting) tactical and operational responses. Separate command
structures may act as a barrier to cooperation, which is something
that organisations attempt to overcome through the use of liaison
roles and shared command facilities. It would appear that the
separate incident command structures adopted during multi-
agency operations do not reﬂect the co-dependency of cooperating
organisations during multi-agency incident responses and appear
not to foster the coordination of activity and development of shared
awareness.
Different perspectives on the nature of the problem and the role
of each agency in the response can lead to misinterpretation of
intentions and a loss of trust across organisations. This may be due
to a lack of experience of working together, which means an
unfamiliarity with different agencies’ working practices, knowl-
edge and requirements, though there may be potentially more
fundamental questions over who is ‘in charge’ of the incident
response. This lack of trust may well adversely impact on inter-
agency cooperation during future multi-agency operations.
4.3. The potential for technology to support
multi-agency operations
A Common Operational Picture (COP) is a single representation
of relevant incident information that could be shared across service
command centres during a multi-agency response (Department of
Defense, 2001). The recent adoption of the Airwave secure digital
communications network by the emergency services in England
and Wales could enable the development of a COP, as it allows for
the formation of multi-user talk groups and the sharing of data; this
may then lead to faster and more appropriate joint service
responses by reducing the level of uncertainty surrounding factors
of the incident. In their discussion of the role of knowledge
management in disaster responses, von Lubitz et al. (2008) high-
light the difﬁculties experienced during large-scale disasters of not
only knowing where to look for information but also in knowing
that it exists; a COP could not only provide a resource for sharing
relevant information, but also a means for contacting the other
agencies involved to request speciﬁc details of the incident. A COP
might be useful during the emergency response incident, in order
to share statements of intent amongst the responding agencies and
to improve information exchange. However, examination of the
Walham incident response has illustrated the difﬁculty of devel-
oping a shared understanding of an incident, particularly between
organisations that are not familiar with each other’s domains of
expertise and work practices. This has implications for the devel-
opment of a COP, as the presentation of information alone would
appear insufﬁcient to enable the development of a common
understanding. Additionally, Mendonça et al. (2007) argue that anattempt to consolidate information in order to facilitate the
development of shared situation awareness is liable to miss out
information which is relevant to one or more of the agencies
involved. Thus, one might instead argue for a Common Relevant
Operational Picture, which would present information in the
format familiar to speciﬁc agencies. This might require additional
functions to ‘translate’ terms, concepts and procedures. The ques-
tion therefore becomes one of whether a COP or other networking
technology can be used to facilitate the development of a common
understanding of an emergency. Mendonça et al. (2007) again
caution that the desire to develop a COP is based on the assumption
that a shared awareness (or understanding) of the situation actually
exists; in this paper, we have attempted to demonstrate that in
order to coordinate multi-agency operations, a level of shared
understanding between organisations and levels of command is
a necessary feature. Finally, Mendonça et al. (2007) argues that
technological systems must enhance organisational agility. Given
the important role played by both formal and ad hoc Liaison Ofﬁ-
cers in bridging the gap between different organisations and levels
of command, building trust and enabling effective cooperation, it
may therefore be advisable to use the COP to support or further
enhance this role, making the Liaison Ofﬁcer the link between
different layers of the operational picture.
This case study has demonstrated the requirement for respond-
ing organisations to be able to adapt themselves to exceptional
circumstances and lends weight to the argument that any support-
ing technologies must be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to be able to copewith
the implementation of innovative working practices (Jul, 2007).4.4. Civil Contingencies Act
Returning to the eight guiding principles for emergency
response as deﬁned in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (HM
Government, 2005b), it is possible to summarise the ﬁndings of
this report in relation to each one:
1. Direction e clarity of purpose deﬁned by a strategic aim and
objectives (i.e. Command Intent): A common strategic aim may
still translate into conﬂicting tasks and activities at the opera-
tional level, requiring the recognition of a single point of
command across all organisations. Technologies (such as
a COP) may be used to make operational level planning and
activities more easily visible and understandable to different
agencies, enabling the rapid identiﬁcation and resolution of
points of conﬂict.
2. Integratione effective and efﬁcient coordination between agencies
involved in the response: Coordination may be more or less
effective at different levels of the multi-agency C2 structure
and individual organisations’ goals, priorities and under-
standing of the situation may present a barrier to coordination.
3. Subsidiaritye coordination occurs at the lowest appropriate level:
Responding organisations each have unique organisational
structures and work to different operational tempos, making
effective coordination of activity difﬁcult, especially where they
are working on the same task, or are sharing the same physical
or temporal space.
4. Preparedness e all agencies, and their members, have clear
understanding of their role and appropriate knowledge and
abilities to undertake these roles: The constraints of an incident
may force individuals and agencies to work outside of their
standard roles and knowledge areas and to closely cooperate
with new partners; this may lead to a level of uncertainty
surrounding who is doing what and who knows what, which
requires close coordination across agencies to resolve.
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Operating Procedures such that their response to the emergency
involves well-drilled activities, albeit at a greater tempo: Multi-
agency operations may well involve groups and individuals
who have never worked together before, are unfamiliar with
each others’ practices and do not share a common language or
set of procedures for dealing with an incident. In addition, the
inherently unpredictable and unique nature of large-scale
crises means that innovation may be necessary and should
therefore be expected and supported, rather than avoided at all
costs.
6. Communication e reliable information is passed as efﬁciently as
possible to all agencies who need it, including the public: There are
a number of barriers to effective communication of information,
both within organisations and between them; communication
is therefore not automatic and requires organisational struc-
tures, roles and technologies which support the sharing of
information.
7. Cooperation e agencies cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust and
understanding: Where agencies are unfamiliar with each
other’s work practices, misunderstandings and mistrust may
result. The need for one-off, ad hoc response collaborations
limits the practicality of training exercises in building trust
between organisations; therefore, the means to rapidly share
understandings and develop effective working practices must
be designed into the processes and technologies intended to
support multi-agency cooperation.
8. Anticipation e risk assessment and identiﬁcation is performed in
an ongoing manner in order to ascertain any possible changes in
level of risk so that the response can be managed as appropriately
and ﬂexibly as possible: As no single agency is likely to be in
possession of all of the relevant facts about the incident, risk
assessment is reliant on effective communication and cooper-
ation between the responding agencies and an acknowledge-
ment of the authority of the decision-maker.
The ﬁndings of this report indicate that multi-agency emer-
gency response may not be as easy or straightforward as the Civil
Contingencies Act envisages; whilst these eight guiding principles
are entirely appropriate to the domain, our research has found that
there are a number of social, organisational and technological
barriers to coordination and cooperation between agencies and
that these principles are unlikely to be achieved during all subse-
quent multi-agency Major Incidents until these problems are
addressed.
5. Conclusions
Whilst the response to this emergency was a success, a number
of adaptations to standard organisational structures, processes and
procedures were necessary; some difﬁculties in terms of Shared
Awareness and Inter-agency Cooperation have been identiﬁed,
which related to inexperience of personnel and organisations in
working together, though which may also stem from a more
fundamental question over the recognition of command authority.
These ﬁndings have implications for future training for major
emergencies; whilst UK emergency services already conduct peri-
odical large-scale multi-agency training scenarios, personnel
should also be trained to adapt to the requirement to work with
new partner agencies at short notice and to recognise and prepare
for the need for improvisation in exceptional circumstances.
One of the recommendations of the report into the Federal
response to Hurricane Katrina was the establishment of “a National
Operations Centre to coordinate the national response and provide
situational awareness and a common operating picture for the entireFederal government” (Townsend, 2006). Whilst this may bring some
improvements to the coordination of multi-agency operations, the
current research suggests that the sharing of information alone is
insufﬁcient to result in a coordinated approach to an incident;
instead, a deeper, shared understanding of the relevant factors in
the incident is required.
Historically, implementations of communications technology
have failed to account for social processes and accommodate them
within the solution, with the result that the ‘improved’ process is
actually less effective, for example in the case of the London
Ambulance Service’s computer-aided dispatch system (LASCAD)
project failure (Beynon-Davies, 1999). Oversimpliﬁcation of the
process of crisis management could lead to similar failures, for
example Comfort (1993) stated that in disaster environments:
“.common training and skills enable multiple units to work readily in
coordinated action.”; something which we have demonstrated is
clearly not always the case and which must be taken into account
when designing technologies to support multi-agency operations.
It is therefore suggested that a more sociotechnical systems view,
i.e. the optimisation of both social and technical systems (Cherns,
1976; Clegg, 2000; Trist and Bamforth, 1951), should be taken
during the design of future networking technologies and the
reorganisation of response agencies, to ensure that the relevance of
complex social issues, such as trust, to multi-agency operations is
identiﬁed and that the unanticipated consequences of even small
changes to command and control networks is recognised. For
example: in terms of training, this research suggests that in addi-
tion to preparing for particular types of emergencies or practicing
SOPs, there is a need to provide opportunities for emergency
response personnel to practice generic skills related to information
sharing and collaborative sense-making.
This study has shown that effective cooperation across agencies
requires more than merely the exchange of information and that
developing shared understanding is a cruciale but labour intensive
e process. It also highlights the necessity for command and control
structures and technologies to be ﬂexible, in order to accommodate
the changing demands of unique situations and multi-agency
associations.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by a grant from the Human Factors
Integration Defence Technology Centre, part-funded by the Human
Capability Domain of the UKMinistry of Defence Scientiﬁc Research
Programme. The authors would like to thank personnel from Avon
Fire and Rescue Service, Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service,
The Environment Agency (Operations Delivery team) and 43
(Wessex) Brigade for their assistance with this research.
Appendix
A.1. High-level question sets used during interviews
Background
 What is your role within your organisation?
 What was your role during the ﬂoods in Gloucestershire?
Timeline #1: general ﬂood emergency
 Brief description of events ewhat happened, where, when?
Timeline #2: electricity substation defence in detail
 Description of events e what happened, where, when?
How was the response organised #1: within your agency?
 Describe your organisational structure
 Does your agency have a process that they follow for dealing
with these types of incidents?
 What were your overall goals during the incident?
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How was the response organised #2: across services?
 What was the command structure?
 Which agency was in overall command?
How was communication managed?
 What communications systems were in use within and
across agencies?
 Were they compatible?
How was activity coordinated/commanded across agencies?
 What other agencies were involved?
 What were other agencies doing?
 What were their goals?
 Who decided on priorities?
What were the main decision points?
 #1 For you/your agency?
 #2 For other agencies?
 At what level were various decisions made e strategic,
tactical or operational?
 What were your speciﬁc goals at the various decision
points?
What were the main difﬁculties that you/your agency
experienced?
 #1 In resolving the incident?
 #2 In working with other agencies?References
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